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| Non-fiction and essays |
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| University essays |
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| History Second Year |
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| The History of Russia 326 |
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| The Cherry Orchard – Trofimov the Populist (HST 326, Autumn 2002) Though Anton Chekhov may not have approved, the characters he creates in “The Cherry Orchard” can be seen as representative of various social groups in Russia before and after the end of the Nineteenth Century. In the character of Pyotr Trofimov, the reader is presented with a fairly comprehensive, though some might argue stereotypical, portrait of the new breed of revolutionaries prevalent among Russian university students. More specifically he demonstrates enough characteristics of a certain type of revolutionary, that I would classify him as a populist. This might explain the fact that while he calls for an awakening of the people, his own personal lack of action stopped him from being the hero of the play when it was performed under the Soviet regime. I will attempt to show, through a study of Trofimov’s attitude to the past, the present and the future, together with his attitude to the other characters in the play, that he could indeed be called a populist. After a relatively quiet first act, the second reveals more of Trofimov’s ideals, in a succession of long monologues, first in response to Lopakhin, and secondly when he is alone with Anya. It is this second speech that gives some idea about Trofimov’s attitude towards the past, the days before the emancipation of the serfs. He tells Anya: “All your ancestors were serf-owners, they owned living souls…Owning people – I mean, it’s corrupted all of you.” In mentioning the corruption of the nobility through serfdom, it can be inferred that Trofimov believes the problem has not simply disappeared with the coming of the emancipation. This is a subtle hint that he believes the problems of the past are still present in contemporary society, an idea that he continues later when he says they must “redeem the past”, something that can only be accomplished through “suffering, through hard remitting toil”.# Therefore, for Trofimov, the problems of the present, are directly linked to the past, and must be overcome in order for Russia to become a better place. While only hinting at the past, Trofimov shows more clearly defined populist views of the present. He describes the plight of the working classes, and the awful conditions they have to endure: Ordinary working people eat like pigs, sleep without pillows, thirty or forty to a damp stinking room, crawling with bedbugs and rife with immorality.# This view of the conditions of the working classes coincides with the views of populists, who saw “factory industry as degrading and dehumanizing”.# However, Trofimov does not just limit his criticism to the treatment of the working classes; he also comes down hard on the attitudes of the intelligentsia: The vast majority of educated people, those I know, seek after nothing, do nothing, and are frankly incapable of work. They call themselves an intelligentsia, but they treat their servants as inferiors, they regard the peasants as domestic animals, they’ve no head for study, or serious reading, they do absolutely nothing, they talk about science, that’s all, and they’ve little or no idea about art.# This does appear to be a slightly hypocritical attitude, coming from Trofimov, who is called an ‘eternal student’ by Lopakhin, and does not seem to be capable of taking action himself, but this fits in with the idea of him being a populist. Another way in which he complains about the present is in reference to the past, when he says: We’re still at least two hundred years behind the times here, we still have absolutely nothing, no clearly defined attitude towards the past, all we do is philosophize, complain about being bored or drink vodka.# It seems that while his university education has given him a broader understanding of the situation in Russia, which would have been the result of exposure to different types of people, it has not been enough to spur him into action. When Trofimov looks towards the future, the reader can almost imagine him glazing over as he foresees the wonderful possibilities that could become of his country. He readily admits that there is a lot to be done, but on the other hand, seems rather vague in describing what exactly needs to be accomplished. He tells Anya how his soul is “filled with an inexpressible feeling of anticipation – I can feel the happiness approaching” and seeks to assure her that if they are not around to see it, “well, what does it matter? Other people will!”# While he talks about this future ‘happiness’ the reader is never really told what that will entail exactly, it is simply couched in broad terms, ideals more than a concrete plan of action. Towards the end of the play, he makes an impassioned declaration to Lopakhin that: “Yes, mankind is marching towards the highest truth, the highest form of happiness possible on this earth, and I’m in the front ranks!” Lopakhin then asks Trofimov if he believes he will get there, to which Trofimov replies: “I’ll get there, or I’ll show others the way.” This is another example of his populist views, the idea that it is up to the people to get to the ‘happiness’ themselves, but it is his role as an intellectual, an idealist, to guide them on their way, how “a ‘critically thinking’ elite should propagandize and agitate among the people’, but that it would require “popular revolution, not parliaments [to] produce a decentralized socialist order.”# While he may be clear in his own mind about the eventual outcome of this ‘popular revolution’, he never shares his plans with the reader. In his dialogues with other characters in the play, it is possible to see a more rounded portrait of Trofimov, not simply a revolutionary idealist. When he talks with Lopakhin, the hard-working serf, now a successful merchant, he displays his contempt for capitalist ideals. Trofimov describes him as a “wild beast, devouring everything that crosses its path” however admits reluctantly that Lopakhin is “necessary too”.# This attempt to hide his views against the appearance of a newly rich capitalist class is thinly veiled, and throughout the play, his verbal sparring with Lopakhin may be interpreted as the clash of capitalist and socialist ideas. As epitomized by Lopakhin, the reader is presented with Trofimov’s perception of the ‘modern’ people in Russian society, those that have been more or less created by the emancipation. The more old-fashioned members of society, represented by Pishchik and Ranevskaya, are treated with just as much ire, though for different reasons. With Pishchik, Trofimov complains that he had the opportunity to do something useful with his time and money, but instead has wasted it, neglecting his chance to “turn the world upside-down.”# In his talks with Ranevskaya, it is her refusal to stop living in the past that provokes Trofimov, saying that she should face the truth, at least once in her life, when she refuses to admit that she will lose the cherry orchard. Thus Trofimov appears to have issues with both the modern and old-fashioned people in Russia, which begs the question, to which category does he belong? In my opinion, Trofimov represents an interesting dilemma when one wishes to place him definitively as either modern or old-fashioned. For while it is clear that he has some very modern views, fostered in his university studies, his lack of real action suggests an unwillingness to bring about the change himself. If he were truly to be seen as ‘modern’, he would have to get more involved in changing society, rather than just spouting vague references to a future happiness and arguing with people who are possibly only slightly more old-fashioned than him. When Ranevskaya sees him for the first time in the play, she comments on how old he looks, wondering if he can possibly still be a student, but in reply to this he says “I think I’m the eternal student”, therefore suggesting his reluctance to move on with his life, and become truly modern.# It is clear that Trofimov has lofty ideals, the desire to make all Russia equal, which must have been developed during his time at university. He is reluctant to identify himself with the lazy intelligentsia, but it seems obvious that is just what he has become. While he can see a great future for Russia, one that can only be brought about by the people who are oppressed, the workers, servants and former peasants, he is very guarded and vague as to how this populist revolution will occur, and precisely how he will help bring it about. Perhaps Chekhov saw the character of Trofimov as Russia’s unfulfilled potential, such great ideas produced by great minds, but very little had actually changed. This idea is summed up by Trofimov’s bold statement: Forward! We’re marching irresistibly towards that bright star, shining in the distance! Forward! Don’t hang back my friends!# Trofimov may well think that the march of the Russian people is irresistible, but he guards his plans so closely, that one wonders if he has told anyone the route of that march, or if indeed he is leading it. Research Project: Why did Khrushchev put missiles in Cuba? (HST 326, Autumn 2002) When Nikita Khrushchev made the decision to place missiles in Cuba in the spring of 1962, he brought the Cold War to its most dangerous point, where nuclear war could have been a devastating consequence. The reasons behind this decision are myriad, with many global concerns on the mind of the Soviet leadership, not only Cuba, as noted by Adam Ulam: “It is curious how these small countries – Cuba, Albania, Israel, Vietnam – provide the world with the most momentous crises, and how they have obscured and complicated the two major issues calling for the attention of the rival superpowers: Germany and China.”# Indeed, in trying to explain the placement of missiles in Cuba, it is necessary to examine in some detail the state of Soviet foreign relationships in the preceding years. These relationships include the diplomatic conflict over post- World War II Germany, with special regard to Berlin, the fracturing relationship between the Soviet Union and China, as well contentions between the United States and the Soviet Union over Cuba itself. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, new research has been conducted in the Russian archives, and while only a small percentage has been either released or translated into English so far, more information relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis is being uncovered by Russian and Western scholars. This information promises to shed further light on the reasoning of the Soviet leadership in making such a potentially disastrous decision. West Berlin was considered a thorn in the side of East Germany by the Soviet leadership, and had caused friction between the two superpowers since the end of the Second World War. Since West Germany’s acceptance into NATO in 1955 and the creation of the Warsaw Pact that legitimized the presence of Soviet troops throughout Eastern Europe, there had existed an uneasy tension between the two armed camps.# Khrushchev was the driving force behind Soviet claims for a peace treaty to be signed with East Germany. This treaty would formalize relations between the German Democratic Republic and the USSR. In signing such a treaty, the permanent division of Germany would be legitimized and West Berlin would be transformed into a “demilitarized free city.” In doing this, Khrushchev also precipitated the second Berlin crisis.# Armed forces were on greater states of alert, and tensions remained high between the two superpowers. In a ‘secret speech’ referring to the Berlin crisis in August 1961, Khrushchev, still hopeful that he could achieve his wishes, tried to explain his reasons for demanding the treaty. He said that “the peace treaty…will weaken the West and, of course, the West will not agree with it. Their eviction from West Berlin will mean closing of the channels for their subversive activities against us.”# This “closing of the channels” would also benefit East Germany by restricting the flight to West Berlin of approximately 100,000 East Germans each year, most of whom were professionals, sometimes dubbed a ‘brain drain’.# Khrushchev continued to set deadlines for the signing of a treaty beginning at the Geneva Conference in May 1959, where he declared that the “Berlin question” had to be resolved in the next eighteen months. As noted by Jim Broderick, “Berlin had become a key test of the balance of power, as well as a battle of wills between the two leaders of the superpowers themselves.”# Although these deadlines passed without conflict, the continual threats from the Soviets resulted in the eventual construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, seemingly overnight from the Western perspective. According to Oleg Troyanovsky, former foreign policy assistant to Nikita Khrushchev, “the [Berlin] Wall meant the virtual end of the Berlin Crisis and tacit acknowledgement that it had failed to achieve its main purpose – to compel the Western Powers to seek compromise on the German problem.”# There was to be an uneasy situation between the two parts of Germany, especially when the issue of deploying nuclear weapons in either was brought up. While the issue of arming East Germany had given cause for concern for the West when first voiced by Khrushchev in 1958, it also resulted in worrying Czechoslovakia and Poland, supposedly in the Soviet sphere of influence, as well as the Russian population. However, from the Soviet perspective, the problem revolved around the issue of a “more fundamental concession” of an “iron-bound guarantee against West Germany getting nuclear weapons.”# Indeed, in a series of speeches made in 1961, Khrushchev made reference to Western refusals to sign a peace treaty with Germany. He claimed the Western Powers had transformed West Germany “into a militarist state.”# Khrushchev continued this argument by claiming that a “peace treaty is essential to strengthen peace and eliminate the remnants of the Second World War” and that the Soviet Union “wants to sign a peace treaty with Germany together with our former allies.”# It was arguably as a result of these tensions that Khrushchev saw the missiles he would place in Cuba as a bargaining chip for the more important issue over Berlin. If Khrushchev’s gambit succeeded and he could install the missiles secretly, the sudden revealing of their presence might shock the United States into accepting any demand that Khrushchev could wish to make regarding Berlin. When the Berlin Wall was erected, Khrushchev made efforts to point out to the Chinese that it was not a substitute for a peace treaty with East Germany.# This statement was a response to the Chinese who had emerged as potential challengers to the Soviets as leaders of world communism, and this pressure would be another telling factor in the decision to put missiles in Cuba. After China had increased in power following the Communist seizure of control under Mao Tse-tung, they could now challenge the Soviet Union in Asia, and were a considerable threat to Siberia, still sparsely populated. With two increasingly equal leaders of world communism, the Sino-Soviet split threatened to divide the whole communist bloc. Initially, in the 1950s, the Soviet Union had encouraged the communist takeover in China, by sending supplies and advisors to help the revolution take the direction they saw as being favorable to the USSR. Under Stalin, the Chinese had received access to Soviet advanced weaponry, including nuclear weapons. In the post-Stalin era however, the relationship became shaky and eventually would result in collapse. Khrushchev had attempted to establish a “Warsaw-like pact” in Asia with the Chinese, involving a closer military relationship. This proposal, circulated between 1957 and 1959 was perceived by the Chinese as an attempt by the Soviets to gain greater leverage over them.# Mao himself saw the interests of the Chinese as being more closely linked with other countries, especially those in the Third World, who were fighting revolutionary struggles against imperialism, and not coinciding with the goals of the Soviet Union.# With this philosophy of Mao’s, it was inevitable that Cuba would present a point of contention between the two communist giants. After relations between the Chinese and the Soviets had begun to falter in the late 1950s, the focus of Chinese criticism turned to Khrushchev’s apparent wish to compromise and deal peacefully with the United States. According to the Chinese, “global war with the imperialists was inevitable”, and Khrushchev’s negotiations with the United States was contradictory to this idea.# Khrushchev later noted in his memoirs that he remembered coming back from China in 1954 and telling his comrades: ““Conflict with China is inevitable.” I came to this conclusion on the basis of various remarks Mao had made.”# These differences were initially kept hidden from the outside world, but by the Romanian Party Congress in 1960, the split would become glaringly apparent. Khrushchev would later recall the Romanian Congress in his memoirs: “a fight broke out between those who supported the policy of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the Pro-Chinese wing on the other. Thus, the conflict was publicly revealed for the first time.”# The Albanian delegation had voiced their support for the Chinese, and this caused concern among the Soviets as to whether other communist countries might also side with the Chinese. Soon after the Romanian Congress, the Soviet Union withdrew its advisors from China, saying that the Chinese had pursued “an apparently unfriendly line toward the Soviet Union, which was incompatible with the obligation of the treaty as well as with the norms prevailing between socialist countries.”# At this time, with Cuba still emerging from the 1959 seizure of power by Fidel Castro, the two communist giants turned towards the Caribbean to try to “spread their respective understandings of Marxism among the Cuban revolutionaries.”# It was partly because of the militant communist views of the Chinese that the Soviet leadership felt compelled to prove they were not imperialist appeasers, and what better way to demonstrate their commitment to anti-capitalist ideals than by placing nuclear missiles ninety miles from American shores. After initially being noncommittal towards communism, Fidel Castro eventually welcomed the patronage of the Soviet Union. This was partly through the influence of his brother Raul and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, both keen to accept communism, but also through threats from American-backed counter-revolutionaries to his government. Throughout the first few years of the Castro regime, there existed the constant threat of an invasion, either by the American military itself, or Cuban troops sponsored by the United States. This threat to Cuba was another reason behind Khrushchev’s missile deployment. According to many sources on the Soviet side, including Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and Sergo Mikoyan, son of Khrushchev’s deputy premier Anastas Mikoyan, the desire on Khrushchev’s part to protect Cuba from invasion was sincere. Sergo Mikoyan affirmed that “Khrushchev had “only two thoughts” in sending the missiles: “Defend Cuba and repair the [strategic] imbalance. But defending Cuba was the first thought.””# Ambassador Dobrynin, while acknowledging the defense of Cuba as a driving force, declared that “the move was part of a broader geopolitical strategy to achieve greater parity with the United States” #, which could then be used to make gains in Berlin and other areas of Soviet interest. The establishment of nuclear missiles in Cuba was one step further than the initial deployment of Warsaw Pact conventional weapons in Cuba that Khrushchev had authorized in 1959. He had carried this out over the opposition of foreign policy advisors, in order to demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that he would “take risks to prove Soviet aims in Latin America.”# In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalled that the question of Cuba had caused him much consternation during a visit to Bulgaria in the spring of 1962, that losing Cuba would have been “a terrible blow to Marxism-Leninism”#. He continued this line of thought to reach the conclusion that missiles were the answer. Reiterating his claims that the Soviets did not want a war with the United States, Khrushchev stated that “Only a fool would think that we wanted to invade the American continent from Cuba. Our goal was precisely the opposite: we wanted to keep the Americans from invading Cuba, and, to that end, we wanted to make them think twice by confronting them with our missiles.”# From the Cuban perspective, the decision to place missiles in their country was out of their hands. Indeed, while the decision had been made in April 1962, the Cubans were only told when Raul Castro visited the Soviet Union in June of that year. As suggested by Ulam, “it is improbable that [Raul Castro] was told exactly what kind of missiles the Soviets would install and quite improbable that he was told for what purpose.”# The inference is that while presented as a defensive measure to help deter an American invasion of Cuba, other Soviet aims were more important. After the crisis had passed, in an interview with Le Monde, Fidel Castro stated that the Soviets had proposed placing missiles in Cuba “to strengthen the socialist camp on the world scale”#, suggesting a willingness, at least publicly to present a unified communist front. The threat to Cuba of an invasion had seemed imminent to the Soviet leadership since the abortive “Bay of Pigs” invasion in April 1961. According to Sergo Mikoyan: “Khrushchev thought an invasion was inevitable, that it would be massive, and that it would use all American force. Khrushchev’s solution: send missiles to Cuba!”# This fear among Khrushchev and his advisors would be another contributing factor in sending missiles to Cuba, where they could deter any potential American invasion. The question of the strategic imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union was another determining factor in the placement of missiles in Cuba, the so-called “missile gap.” This was an issue of great concern for the Soviet leadership, and one of great confusion for the Americans. American military estimates and Soviet rhetoric had convinced the United States that the Soviet nuclear missile arsenal was far greater than that of the U.S. This information though had spurred the United States into vastly increasing its own nuclear weapon stockpile, to the point where the strategic imbalance was very much in the United States’ favor. The Russian space program, beginning with Sputnik’s launch in 1957 had been a key factor in the American fears of a Soviet nuclear superiority. Khrushchev was keen for the West to retain this mistaken idea, and subsequently used it to try to gain political concessions and psychological leverage in the years after 1957.# Khrushchev attempted to force the West to make favorable concessions regarding the Berlin issue, albeit with little success. This lack of success in using their imagined missile superiority led to another point of contention on the part of the Soviets: the U.S. missile bases in countries such as Turkey and Italy. It was the American missiles in Turkey that posed the greatest danger to the Soviet Union, where they could in theory destroy her southern cities. It should be noted that these missiles in Turkey were actually closer to the Soviet Union than those in Cuba, and that the Soviet Union had lived under their shadow since they had become operational in early 1962.# Khrushchev would be able to argue that missiles in Cuba were offset by those in Turkey, located there for purely defensive reasons; hence world opinion should be in his favor. This was contrary to his statements of the previous year, when he had repeatedly talked of Soviet self-restraint concerning American deployment of forces in European countries surrounding the Soviet Union, and kept reiterating the desire for both sides to “reduce the armed forces stationed on foreign soil.”# This continued Khrushchev’s peaceful rhetoric, which had included a reduction in Soviet armed forces in 1960, where he told the Presidium that the “ideological debates with capitalism will be resolved not through war, but through economic competition.”# Khrushchev had taken this line in his communications with President Kennedy, when he repeatedly referred to the “concrete facts” of American bases, while declaring the Soviet Union did not intend to establish any bases in Cuba.# The limitations of Soviet missile technology necessitated a site close to the United States if they were going to offset the superior capabilities of the American ICBMs and European-based missiles. Still about a decade away from reaching parity in inter-continental missiles, the Soviets had many intermediate-range missiles that could easily threaten American cities from Cuba.# Khrushchev had decided that “it was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land her own people threatened.”# By installing missiles in Cuba, he certainly achieved this aim, albeit only for a short period of time. There was a certain contempt that Khrushchev held for the new American President, John F. Kennedy, which contributed to his decision over placing missiles in Cuba. The Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had informed Khrushchev of his opinions of Kennedy following his declaration as a presidential candidate in 1960, both in matters of foreign affairs and Kennedy’s personality. His contradictory report noted that “Kennedy…grants the possibility of a mutually acceptable settlement of [U.S.-Soviet] relations on the basis of a mutual effort to avoid nuclear war,” while in the same document declared that Kennedy “openly announces that the USA should sooner start a nuclear war than leave Berlin.”# For Khrushchev, with American elections approaching in late 1962, this suggested that Kennedy might decide to hide the news of the missiles, if he discovered their presence in Cuba, until after the elections, where he might be more concessionary.# It is interesting to note the American government’s responses to Khrushchev’s action through their discussion in the “ExComm” meetings following the discovery of the missiles. What is more interesting is how perceptive they were of some of the reasons behind the crisis. Dean Rusk noted that CIA Director John McCone had acknowledged that “Mr. Khrushchev…knows we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours. Also, we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.”# After perceiving these reasons as explanations for the Soviet missile deployment, Rusk continued by saying that he wondered “whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We’ve already talked about his obsession with it.”# These statements suggest that the U.S. government were aware of the principal causes of the missile crisis, without the benefit of hindsight or declassified Soviet documents. This partly explains the decision to remove the missiles in Turkey as a compromise, albeit hidden between Robert Kennedy’s discussions with Georgi Bolshakov, a KGB back channel to Khrushchev. An interesting take on the missiles in Cuba was that they were not actually equipped with nuclear warheads, and that Khrushchev never intended to equip them thusly. Richard Lebow, writing in the late 1980s conjectured that missiles were not essential to Khrushchev’s objectives, and that as long as Washington thought the missiles were nuclear, he could still achieve his demands.# Despite the fact that later research largely debunked this theory, it suggests the potential psychological effect that the presence of missiles near the American homeland might have. The fact that these missiles were potentially nuclear is even more chilling in retrospect. The international factors at work in the late 1950s and early 1960s had presented Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev with a dilemma of how to proceed in his Cold War strategy, and which would eventually lead to the deployment of missiles in Cuba. Berlin and the question of Germany was still unresolved, and wishing to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany, Khrushchev required some sort of leverage over the Americans. Missiles in Cuba satisfied this requirement. Secondly, the Chinese had moved away from the Soviet Union and were becoming a second communist giant for the rest of the socialist world to look upon as a role model. This meant that the Soviet Union needed to retain their strong militaristic image, something that had been eroded by Chinese accusations of appeasement. By placing nuclear missiles close threateningly close to the United States, the Soviet leadership could point to their desire to battle capitalism and reaffirm their supremacy in the communist world. Cuba was the testing ground between the Soviet Union and China for ideological influence and with the threat of an American invasion to remove the Castro regime, nuclear missiles offered a sufficient deterrent to any potential strike against Cuba. This would therefore cement the Cuban position with the Soviets and not with Beijing. The presence of a Soviet nuclear missile base close to the United States would go some way to redress the strategic imbalance favoring the U.S. and counter the American missile bases surrounding the Soviet Union. When these factors were combined in the mind of Khrushchev, the most suitable course of action was to employ the missiles, hopefully without the knowledge of the Americans. Khrushchev could go to the United Nations and “present to the world a dramatic package deal resolving the world’s most momentous problems: the German peace treaty, containing an absolute prohibition against nuclear weapons for Bonn; and a similar proposal in reference to the Far East, where the Soviets would demand a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific and, under this guise, extract a pledge from the Chinese not to manufacture atomic weapons.”# The Soviet leadership took the decision over deploying missiles in Cuba as a potentially dangerous course of action, but ultimately, one they had no choice but to make in the light of all the foreign affairs problems that converged in the early 1960s. Bibliography Primary Material: Garthoff, Raymond L. (comp.). “Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. 5 (1995): 58, 63-77. Hershberg, James G. “New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. 8-9 (1996-97): 270-277. Khrushchev, Nikita S. Communism – Peace and Happiness for the Peoples. Two Volumes. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing, 1963). --------------, Khrushchev Remembers. Translated and Edited by Strobe Talbott. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970). --------------, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Translated and Edited by Strobe Talbott. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974). --------------, Reports on the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 17, 1961. (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961). May, Ernest R and Philip D Zelikow. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1997). Sampson, Charles S (ed.). US Department of State: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges. http://www.state. gov/www/about_state/history/volume_vi/exchanges.html 13/11/02 No given author. “Russian Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. 8-9 (1996-97): 278-338. Secondary Sources: Beschloss, Michael R. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991). Broderick, Jim. “Berlin and Cuba Cold War Hotspots.” History Today. 48, no. 12 (1998): 23-29. Chang, Gordon H. Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948 -1972. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). Dinerstein, Herbert S. The Making of a Missile Crisis, October 1962. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976). Dobrynin, Anatoly. In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986). (New York: Times Books, 1995). Dmytryshyn, Basil. “Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich.” The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History. 16: 191-202. Fursenko, Aleksandr and Timothy Naftali. “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958- 1964. (New York: WW Norton, 1997). Garthoff, Raymond L. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987). Gorodetsky, Gabriel (ed.). Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991: A Retrospective. (London: Frank Cass, 1994). Lebow, Richard Ned. “Was Khrushchev bluffing in Cuba?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 44, no.3 (1988): 38-42. Libbey, James K. “Cuban Missile Crisis.” The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History. 47: 235- 240. MacKenzie, David and Michael W Curran. Russia and the USSR in the Twentieth Century, 4th Edition. (Hartford: Wadsworth, 2002). Medvedev, Roy. Khrushchev. Translated by Brian Pearce. (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1984). Noonan, Norma C. “Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union.” The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History. 48: 114-121. Prozumenschikov, M.Y., K Weathersby, S Kirchhoff and M Doctoroff. “The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. 8-9 (1996-97): 251-257. Scherer, John L. “Reinterpreting Soviet Behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis.” World Affairs. 144, no.2 (1981): 110-125. Taubman, W., S Khrushchev and A Gleason (eds.). Nikita Khrushchev. Translated by David Gehrenbeck, Eileen Kane and Alla Bashenko. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). Thompson, Robert Smith. The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). Thompson, William J. Khrushchev: A Political Life. (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1997). Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967. (New York: Praeger, 1968). |
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