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| Non-fiction and essays |
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| University essays |
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| American Studies Third Year |
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| Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War 332 |
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| Evaluate the tone and argument of Lincoln’s first Inaugural Address. Abraham Lincoln’s first Inaugural Address of March 4, 1861 came at a crucial time in American history, and in circumstances unlike any other presidential speech. The states of the Deep South, led by South Carolina, had already seceded, and there were movements towards secession in the other slavery states. Lincoln used the address to send a message to those on both sides of the crisis, and perhaps more importantly, to those wavering in the middle. Some of the ideas for the address he had tested out, albeit tentatively, in speeches to crowds on his route to Washington.# The tone of Lincoln’s speech was one of authority, but also conciliation towards his wayward Southern brothers. Above all, the message that Lincoln sent was that the continued existence of the Union was of paramount importance, and he did not stop short of indications of what might ensue should anyone try to destroy the Union. In the first part of the Inaugural, and throughout the whole address, Lincoln reinforces the legitimacy of his position, and the responsibilities that the position entails. To accomplish this he makes reference to the oath of office he has taken with the first sentence he speaks. This is a device that Lincoln used often during the early stages of his presidency, referring to the fact that he derives his authority from being duly elected by the people of the United States, something that his Confederate opponent Jefferson Davis cannot lay claim to. As Lincoln is building up to his grand finish, he reminds the audience that the ‘Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of the States.’ # This demonstrates his position is legitimate, and also infers that the course of action taken by the seceding states is illegitimate, a clear instance of his authoritarian tone. In another reference to the supreme authority of the people that have invested him with powers, he alludes to the Supreme Court decision in the Dred Scott case by saying that while they have the duty to make rulings as they need to, ‘it is no fault of theirs, if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes.’# In making this statement, Phillip Shaw Paludan has suggested that Lincoln is asserting his authority over the Court, by inferring that he would not let an unelected body determine policy for the whole country.# As well as authority, Lincoln makes reference to the responsibility that he owes to the people who elected him. As the president was elected by predominantly Republican voters, he feels that he cannot reject the stance of the Republican party, the very platform on which he was elected. He unashamedly plagiarises his own speeches, and restates parts of the Republican platform, such as when he declares: ‘we denounce the lawless invasion by armed forces of the soil of any State of Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.’# However, he does not go into very much detail on the specific points of the Republican platform, other than to refer the listeners to look up the ‘published speeches of him who now addresses you’ to find what he has said on his course of action towards the South and their peculiar institution. As Richard Carwardine has suggested, the reason for such a limited reference to his party’s platform is that he must bind the pro-Union Democrats to his cause, a need to ‘sink the partisan in the patriot’ in the conflict that was looming.# Lincoln asserts that he carries both the legitimacy of his elected office, but also the responsibility to all the voters, not solely those who elected him, and including those in the Southern states. The main argument of Lincoln’s first Inaugural Address revolves around the status of the Union. For Lincoln, the Union is the oldest building block of the country, which, according to the president ‘is much older than the Constitution. It was formed in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774.’# And more importantly than the age of the Union, in Lincoln’s eyes, is his unrelenting belief in its perpetuity and inviolate nature. He affirms this belief in his powerful statement that ‘in contemplation of universal law, and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual….Continue to execute all the express provisions of our national Constitution, and the Union will endure forever.’# This is a theme that is repeated throughout the address, and in subsequent speeches made by Lincoln. And further than this, as Lincoln considers the Union ‘unbroken,’ he has the express intention to ensure that ‘the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States.’# This is a thinly veiled threat to the secessionists, as in the months leading up to the address, Federal property in the South had been seized. Lincoln, however, in his balancing act between authority and concession, does not go so far as to say he will go to war over a few forts and the delivery of the mail. He does not shy away from inferring that the actions of the secessionists are rebellious: ‘acts of violence, with any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstance.’# Lincoln’s statement is aimed at those who have already departed the Union, declaring that what they have done is illegal, that they have no right to leave the Union, and more importantly, in conjunction with his promise to uphold the laws, that he will not allow them to leave.# Lincoln’s references to the perpetuity of the Union represent his authoritative tone in the Inaugural Address. However, in his treatment of the South, it is possible to see a much more conciliatory message. This has been interpreted by historians partly as the result of Lincoln’s discussion of his initial draft with Orville Browning and William Seward, both of whom felt that his first attempt was far too provocative in terms of declaring he would ‘reclaim’ forts, as well as ‘occupy and hold.’ Under the advice of Browning and Seward, Lincoln dropped the offending phrase.# Lincoln makes an appeal to those in the Upper South slave states who have not yet left the Union, and also to those unionists in the Deep South who he firmly believes will supplant the secessionist elite ‘wreckers’ and return to the fold. He clearly distinguishes between those who are loyal to the Union, and those who would see the Union destroyed by their illegal secession movement. Lincoln declares that if ‘there are persons in one section, or another who seek to destroy the Union’ he will ‘need address no word to them,’ in other words, he is not going to engage in a dialogue with the secessionist leaders. On the other hand he makes a plea by asking ‘To those who really love the Union, may I not speak?’, which is a call to unionists in those slave states that remain in the Union.# In a reiteration of his numerous pledges during his political speeches prior to the Inaugural, Lincoln affirms that he has no inclination to interfere with slavery where it exists. This a further sign of his tone of conciliation. This mood does not extend to the leaders of the secession movement however, which Lincoln compares to a revolution by the minority that does not accept the authority of the majority - a clear violation of the founding principles of the Union. He declares that ‘the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy’ and that ‘the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible’, and from anarchy, despotism is not far behind.# A final message of these references to the South is that the Southerners’ property - including their most important property, slaves - is safer within the Union than without. The need for secession is a drastic step that cannot be justified.# While promising to retain his policy of non-interference with slavery, Lincoln does reinforce his own dislike of the institution by referring to the moral difference between the sections. There is one section that ‘believes slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the only substantial dispute.’# While at first glance this statement may suggest that if a compromise could be reached on slavery, there would be no grounds for the separation of the Union, in reality it is a statement of Lincoln’s refusal to compromise. When he not only occupies the moral high ground over slavery, but the legal and constitutional high ground that the presidency gives him, he will offer some concessions to the Southern states to preserve the Union, but will never allow the further extension of slavery. Indeed, he goes on to declare that the situation ‘cannot be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases after the separation of the sections, than before.’# James McPherson has described the Inaugural Address as Lincoln offering both the sword and the olive branch to the South, with the sword being his stance towards the forts in the South, and the olive branch being his concessionary position over slavery.# This is consistent with the overall tone of the address as authoritative but concessionary, firm but reassuring. Part of this is Lincoln’s desire to assert his authority and responsibility, while wishing to keep the rebellion as small as possible by not alienating the wavering slave states. In Lincoln’s mind there still existed the chance that popular union sentiment in the South would return the wayward states to the Union, though this belief was misplaced. However, this belief, together with the suggestions of Browning and Seward, help to explain the concessions Lincoln was willing to offer on the issue of slavery. On the other hand, there was no compromise on the idea of an unbroken Union, and that the actions of the slaveholding elite who had precipitated the secession crisis were illegal. Lincoln used all his deftness and wealth of expression in trying to outlay his belief in the Union, and what he would do if the Union was threatened. He claimed that he did not regard his intention to execute all the laws of the Union as ‘a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend, and maintain itself.’ # Towards the end of the speech, Lincoln reaffirms that the Southerners could still enjoy the benefits and protections of the Constitution, and there was nothing Lincoln could, or would do to prevent that. However, he lays the responsibility for ‘the momentous issue of civil war’ in the hands of the secessionists and in a final reference to his legitimacy over the illegal Confederate government, he declares that ‘You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one to “preserve, protect, and defend” it.’# Yet where Lincoln would have ended on this combative note, a final olive branch was thrown - at the request of Seward, but which Lincoln greatly improved upon - in which Lincoln appealed to the sense of common history, ‘the mystic chords of memory’ that prevailed among all Americans, North and South, and ended with a final note of conciliation: ‘We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained; it must not break our bonds of affection.’# Thus concluded a speech in which Lincoln asserted his presidential authority, clamoured for the continued existence of the Union, but also hoped for reconcilement between the fractious sections of America. What factors and ideas shaped Lincoln’s military thinking in 1861-1862? After the first shots of the civil war had been fired by the Confederacy, Abraham Lincoln, barely a month into his presidency, was forced to deal with his position as commander-in-chief of the Union armed forces. Lincoln had to contend not only with the realities of organising troops, dealing with generals and formulating strategy, but also in political compromises and rallying the country behind him. Richard Carwardine has suggested that Lincoln’s most pressing objectives were: to nourish and sustain northern political support outside his own Republican party; to strengthen unionist elements in the Upper South to prevent their secession; and thirdly, to prevent the war becoming an international conflict.# There was also the not insignificant matter of prosecuting the war itself, a task that was constantly evolving with victories and defeats on the battlefield. Even before the seizure of Fort Sumter by the Confederates, Lincoln was liasing with his senior advisors, mainly to let them know that it was he alone who was in charge of the Union war effort. In a letter to William Seward, Lincoln’s frustration is evident at Seward’s attempt to usurp his authority by creating an international incident to lessen the impact of secession. In reply to Seward’s suggestion that ‘Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide’ Lincoln agrees, but makes it clear that ‘if this must be done, I must do it.’# Lincoln is making sure that all his cabinet realise that he will make the decisions. A further example of Lincoln asserting his authority as president is in his calling on a special assembly of Congress, but not until July. As several historians have noted, this allowed Lincoln the freedom to exercise his executive powers and take swift action at the war’s outset.# All of the measures that Lincoln took were part of his pledge to ensure the laws of the Union were enforced throughout the country, including in the Confederacy. As part of Lincoln’s strategy to encourage support in the North, necessary to supply the manpower to overwhelm the South, it was important to portray the South as the aggressors in the conflict, with the Union merely responding to threats to dismember it. Part of this strategy had been achieved by getting the Confederates to fire first in the Fort Sumter crisis, and was developed in Lincoln’s subsequent correspondences: ‘I have no objection to declare a thousand times that I have no purpose to invade Virginia or any other State, but I do not mean to let them invade us without striking back.’# This statement continued Lincoln’s affirmation of a policy of persuasion rather than coercion. Above all else, in Lincoln’s mind the Union was to be preserved, which is why in some ways, the first stage of the conflict was protective and conservative, seeking to defend the integrity of the Union, as well as the ideals it embodied, such as democracy and liberty. The second part of Lincoln’s wartime objectives involved appealing to the states of the Upper South to stay within the Union. This was necessary from a military perspective, with the numbers of potential soldiers within these states, and also from the perspective of maintaining the legitimacy of the Union. While Lincoln could not prevent Virginia from seceding, he encouraged unionist supporters in the western part of the state, and endorsed their establishment of a pro-Union administration: ‘Those loyal citizens, this government is bound to recognise, and protect, as being Virginia.’# The more crucial states for Lincoln and the Union war effort were the border slave states, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri. To this end, as Carwardine has noted, in the initial stages of the conflict Lincoln did not bring up the issue of slavery, and did not advocate the arming of black soldiers. He also denounced instances of military emancipation of blacks.# In Lincoln’s address to Congress in December 1861, Lincoln suggested the success of his policy regarding the border states: ‘These three States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, neither of which would promise a single soldier at first, have now an aggregate of not less than forty thousand in the field, for the Union.’# Such a turnaround does indeed suggest that the appeals to the border states had been a victory for the Union. A further part of this strategy towards the southern part of the Union involved appeals to those people of unionist sentiment in the states of the Confederacy. To accomplish this Lincoln stated that the administration would ensure that in the conflict ‘the utmost care will be observed…to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or interference with, property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country.’# While the respect for property was explicitly stated in the first few weeks of war, as the conflict developed, this was cast aside in favour of military necessity. As long as Lincoln held the belief that there was a chance the loyal unionist citizens of the South would rise up and overthrow the secessionist elite, he felt the need to proclaim that ‘Loyal citizens everywhere, have the right to claim this their government; and the government has no right to withhold, or neglect it.’# As the war progressed, this was another early strategy that had to be revised. One of the fundamental aims of the Confederacy in the conflict was to gain recognition from the European powers. The Union government under Lincoln was keen to ensure that this could not happen. To accomplish this goal, Lincoln made it clear that the Confederate government was an illegitimate body, and that he was pursuing military action to suppress an internal insurrection. This course of action corresponded to Lincoln’s belief and rhetoric that the Union was unbroken that he had expounded in the Inaugural Address. In reinforcing this belief, Lincoln explained to Congress in Special Session that ‘Our States have neither more, nor less power, than that reserved to them, in the Union, by the Constitution - none of them ever having been a State out of the Union.’# Part of Lincoln’s military strategy was a blockade of Southern ports, through which he hoped to starve the Confederacy of supplies. Only partially successful during the initial stages of the conflict, the blockade - by the mere choice of the word ‘blockade’ - was an implicit recognition of the Confederacy. However, as David Donald has noted, the blockade was more effective than a closure of ports in limiting foreign involvement, as closing ports could have led to problems with foreign shipping.# Overall, Lincoln’s plan to limit foreign involvement was successfully exploited, and he was justified in explaining to Congress that foreign nations ‘can scarcely have failed to recognise that the effort for disunion produces the existing difficulty,’ thus at the same time also offering another indication that blame for the conflict lay with the Rebels.# Beside the political considerations that affected the conduct of the war in its first years, events in the theatres of battle would also play a role in directing Lincoln’s military strategy. As James McPherson indicates, the South did not have to ‘win’ to be victorious in their struggle. The North had the much harder task of conquering the South, both physically and in spirit. This meant that Lincoln and the North had to carry the fight to the enemy, and use its superior numbers to good effect by attacking many areas at once.# Lincoln used his emergency powers as president to call up a militia, initially only 75,000 strong, to perform a policing action aimed at punishing the rebel leaders. After the defeat at Bull Run, and the reality of the conflict had begun to set in, Lincoln needed more troops, thus his requests increased rapidly to 400,000 men, and soon a million were called forth. This is where Lincoln relied on the strong Unionist sentiment that he had encouraged in the North, as volunteer regiments were formed. Part of Lincoln’s concern for the loyalty of the border states, especially Maryland, was that Washington, the seat of Lincoln’s government lay surrounded by slave states. The first troop movements were aimed at reinforcing the capital’s defences, which were woeful at the outset of hostilities. Lincoln was forced to reassure the local political leaders in Maryland that the troops passing through their state were not an invasion force, but had to pass through their territory to defend the government. He did not hesitate to remind them, however, that if the people ‘will not attack us, we will not attack them, but if they do attack us, we will return it, and that severely.’# It was also in regard to the safety of the capital that Lincoln enacted one of his more controversial decisions, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. He justified this act by asking rhetorically, ‘are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?’# Once Washington was secured, Lincoln could turn his attention to attacking the Confederacy. The sound Union defeat at the battle of Bull Run altered his perceptions of the conflict, and his strategy changed in response. Lincoln called for more troops, more training and more organisation, appointing General George B. McClellan to mould the raw volunteers into a fighting force. The North would then be able to strike effectively at the Rebels, and destroy the Confederacy. The first year of the war was marked by a belief that the conflict would soon be ended, and a confidence of victory on both sides of the sectional divide. Abraham Lincoln had a wide variety of tasks to accomplish to enact his military strategy. He had to maintain and build on the support of unionists in the North, and appeal to those unionists he was sure existed in the South. The border slave states were seen as a crucial resource in terms of military strategy, and providing a further repudiation of the seceding states. Lincoln emphasised the legitimacy of the Union, while proclaiming the inherent illegitimacy of the Confederates. This was in order to gain support from foreign powers such as Britain and France, and their refusal to recognise the Confederacy. Finally he had to find troops to prosecute the war, both on land and in the blockade at sea. Protecting Washington required some potentially extralegal measures, but in his power as commander-in- chief, Lincoln did what he felt was necessary to ensure the continuation of the government against an internal insurrection. Lincoln often referred to the war as a proving ground for the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and described the conflict as a ‘People’s contest.’ He continued: ‘On the side of the Union, it is a struggle for maintaining in the world, that form, and substance of government, whose leading object is, to elevate the condition of men.’# In this spirit, he offered a coherent military strategy aimed at bring the recalcitrant Southerners back into the Union fold. |
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| Non-fiction |
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